Montana Law Review Online
Volume 77

Article 15

6-15-2016

Tyrrell v. BNSF Railway Company: Is BNSF Being Railroaded into
the Montana Court System?
Molenda L. McCarty
Alexander Blewett III School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr_online

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Molenda L. McCarty, Case Note, Tyrrell v. BNSF Railway Company: Is BNSF Being Railroaded into the
Montana Court System?, 77 Mont. L. Rev. Online 109, https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr_online/vol77/
iss1/15.

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Montana Law Review Online by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at University of
Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

2016

CASENOTE: TYRRELL V. BNSF RY. CO.

109

CASENOTE; Tyrrell v. BNSF Railway Company: Is BNSF Being
Railroaded into the Montana Court System?
Molenda L. McCarty
I. INTRODUCTION
“It is one thing to hold a corporation answerable for operations in
the forum State, . . . quite another to expose it to suit on claims having no
connection whatever to the forum State.”1 General jurisdiction is the form
of personal jurisdiction that allows a forum state to assert judicial authority
over “any and all claims” against a defendant who has sufficient, close
contacts with the state—even claims that arise elsewhere.2 In Daimler AG
v. Bauman,3 the United States Supreme Court held that a corporation must
be “essentially at home” in the forum state to assert general jurisdiction.4
To date, the Supreme Court has only found one example of a corporation
“essentially at home” outside of its place of incorporation or principal
place of business.5 Congress’s enactment of the FELA does not make
railroad companies doing business in Montana another example.6 Thus,
the due process of a railroad corporation should be assessed in the same
manner as that of any other corporation by applying the Daimler standard.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
BNSF Railway Company (“BNSF”) is a Delaware corporation
with its principal place of business in Texas.7 Robert Nelson sued BNSF
in Montana’s Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County to
recover damages from knee injuries he allegedly sustained while
employed with BNSF.8 In his complaint, Nelson did not assert that he had
ever worked in Montana or that his injuries were sustained in Montana.9
Kelli Tyrrell (“Tyrrell”), Special Administrator of the Estate of
Brent Tyrrell (“Brent”), also sued BNSF in Yellowstone County when
Brent died, allegedly due to exposure to various carcinogenic chemicals
1

Daimler AG v. Bauman, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 746, 761 n.19 (2014).
Goodyear Dunlop Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (“Specific jurisdiction”
applies when the case itself arises out of or relates to the defendant’s activity within the state.).
3
___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
4
Id., ___ U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 751.
5
See e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (holding that asserting personal
jurisdiction over a foreign company having temporary headquarters in the forum state due to a war
comports with the Due Process Clause); see also Daimler, ___ U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 761, n.19
(“[A] corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place
of business may be so substantial and of such nature as to render the corporation at home in that
State.”).
6
See Tyrrell v. BNSF Ry. Co., 373 P.3d 1, 11–12, (Mont. 2016) (McKinnon, L. dissenting).
7
Id. at 3.
8
Id.
9
Id.
2
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during his employment with BNSF.10 The complaint did not include a
statement that Brent ever worked in Montana or that any chemical
exposure occurred in Montana.11
Nelson and Tyrrell pled violations of the Federal Employers’
Liability Act (FELA),12 and BNSF moved to dismiss both cases for lack
of personal jurisdiction.13 Concerning Nelson’s case, Judge Baugh relied
on the recent United States Supreme Court decision, Daimler AG v.
Bauman,14 and granted the motion to dismiss.15 Judge Baugh held that
BNSF’s “due process rights prevent this Court from exercising general allpurpose jurisdiction over [BNSF] and this Court does not have specific
jurisdiction.”16 Contrarily, Judge Moses denied BNSF’s motion to dismiss
Tyrrell’s case, relying on the Montana Supreme Court and the United
States Supreme Court’s previous interpretation of the FELA’s influence
on personal jurisdiction.17 Judge Moses held that BNSF “does meet the
criteria of being found within Montana and having substantial, continuous
and systematic activities within Montana for general jurisdiction
purposes.”18 BNSF appealed Judge Moses’s order, and Nelson appealed
Judge Baugh’s order.19
III. MAJORITY HOLDING
In an opinion authored by Justice Shea, the majority held that
Montana courts have general personal jurisdiction over BNSF under both
the FELA and Montana law.20 The order granting BNSF’s motion to
dismiss was reversed, the order denying BNSF’s motion to dismiss was
affirmed, and both cases were remanded for further proceedings.21
A. Federal Employers’ Liability Act
The majority based its holding with regard to personal jurisdiction
under the FELA on the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of 45
U.S.C. § 56,22 which allows state courts to hear FELA cases even when

10

Id.
Id.
12
See 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2016).
13
Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 3.
14
___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761–62 (2014) (holding a state has personal jurisdiction over a
corporation when the corporation is incorporated there or has its principal place of business there).
15
Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 3.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 9.
21
Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 9.
22
(A FELA “action may be brought in a district court of the United States, in the district of the
residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be
11
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the only basis for general jurisdiction is the railroad doing business in the
forum state.23 The Court rejected BNSF’s contention that Daimler
supersedes the Supreme Court’s previous interpretation.24 The majority
held that “Daimler did not present novel law”; rather, Daimler merely
reinforced Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown,25 in which
the Court held that general jurisdiction over foreign corporations requires
affiliations so “continuous and systematic” as to render the corporation “at
home” in the forum state.26 Yet, the majority concluded that Congress
drafted the FELA to render a railroad “at home” for jurisdiction purposes
wherever it is “doing business.”27 Because it is undisputed that BNSF is
“doing business” within Montana, the majority concluded that the FELA
confers general personal jurisdiction to Montana state courts.28
B. Montana Law
Montana applies a two-prong test to decide whether it may assert
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident.29 Jurisdiction must be consistent
with Montana’s long-arm statute,30 and the exercise of personal
jurisdiction must comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States.31 The Court held jurisdiction is proper
under the long-arm statute because BNSF is “found within the state of
Montana” when it conducts business, owns real estate, maintains facilities,
has a telephone listing, and does direct advertising in Montana.32 The
majority transitioned to the constitutionality prong emphasizing that
Montana has previously held that “[t]he District Courts of Montana clearly
have jurisdiction” to hear FELA cases.33 Further, the Court held the
doing business at the time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States . . . shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several States.”)
23
Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 4–5; see e.g., Pope v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 379 (1953) (holding
that plaintiff has the right to sue where the railroad is doing business and that the state forum where
the injury occurred is without the power to enjoin prosecution of the suit in the state where the railroad
is doing business); Miles v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 315 U.S. 698 (1942) (holding that the FELA prevents
a state court from enjoining, on the ground of the inconvenience to the railroad, a resident citizen of
the state from furthering an action in a state court of another state which has jurisdiction under the
FELA).
24

Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 6; see Daimler AG v. Bauman, ___U.S.___, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014) (quoting
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (holding that “a court
may assert jurisdiction over a foreign corporation ‘to hear any and all claims against [it]’ only when
the corporation’s affiliations with the State in which suit is brought are so constant and pervasive ‘as
to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.’” (internal citations omitted)).
25
564 U.S. 915 (2011).
26
Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 6 (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919).
27
Id. (citing Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 49–50 (1941)).
28
Id. at 7.
29
Id. at 8.
30
See Mont. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1).
31
Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 8.
32
Id.; see Mont. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1) (“All persons found within the state of Montana are subject to the
jurisdiction of Montana courts.”).
33
Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 8 (quoting Labella v. Burlington N., 595 P.2d 1184, 1186 (Mont. 1979)).
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constitutionality of Montana’s personal jurisdiction over BNSF comported
with the Montana Constitution’s provision that ‘courts of justice shall be
open to every person . . . .”34 Therefore, under both Montana’s long-arm
statute and the Due Process Clause, the majority held that Montana has
general personal jurisdiction over BNSF.35
IV. JUSTICE MCKINNON’S DISSENT
Justice McKinnon authored the dissent, writing that she would
hold that the Montana District Courts lack general personal jurisdiction
over BNSF under the Due Process Clause.36 The dissent emphasized that
the United States Supreme Court has made “clear” that state courts may
only assert general personal jurisdiction when foreign corporations are
“essentially at home” in the forum state.37 The Supreme Court instructed
that a corporation is “essentially at home” where it is incorporated or has
its principal place of business.38 Because BNSF is neither incorporated
under the laws of Montana nor has its principal place of business in
Montana, Justice McKinnon contended that there is “no dispute” that
BNSF is not “at home” in Montana.39 She concluded that BNSF’s contacts
are inadequate to satisfy the due process standards set forth by the
Supreme Court.40
V. ANALYSIS
The FELA enables railroad employees to recover damages for
injuries resulting from a railroad equipment deficiency or from the
negligence of the agents or employees of the railroad.41 Although it seems
anomalous today that only railroad workers have a federal remedy for
workplace injuries rather than a state workers’ compensation remedy, the
roots of the FELA stem from the unique role of the American railroad
employee. In the late nineteenth century, the average life expectancy of a
switch-man was seven years, and a brakeman’s chance of dying from
natural causes was less than one in five.42 In response to the dangers of
railroad working conditions, Congress enacted the present law in 1908.43
Prior to the FELA, injured railroad workers found recovery difficult
34

Id. at 9 (quoting Mont. Const., art II, § 16).
Id.
36
Id. at 9 (McKinnon, L. dissenting).
37
Id. (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tire
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).
38
Id. at 10 (quoting Daimler, ___ U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 760).
39
Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 10 (McKinnon, L. dissenting).
40
Id. at 11.
41
45 U.S.C. § 51 (2016).
42
Thomas E. Baker, Why Congress Should Repeal the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of 1908, 29
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 79, 81 (1992).
43
Railroad Employers’ Liability, Pub. L. No. 60–100, 35 Stat. 65 (1908).
35
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because of common-law tort principles.44 The FELA served the public
policy objectives of doing away with the fellow-servant rule, the doctrine
of assumption of risk, and the principle of contributory negligence as a
complete defense.45 Enacted in New York in 1910, the first workers’
compensation law was almost immediately struck down as
unconstitutional.46 Since workers’ compensation was not a viable
legislative option in the early twentieth century, the FELA was ahead of
its time and ensured compensation for injured railroad workers.47
The statute sets forth that federal jurisdiction shall be concurrent
with that of the states and that FELA claims can be brought in the district
in which the defendant resides, in which the action arose, or in which the
defendant is doing business.48 The Supreme Court has addressed the
question of whether the Act compels the states to accept jurisdiction a
number of times. States cannot reject jurisdiction simply because the claim
was brought under a federal act49 or when the FELA does not coincide
with existing state workers’ compensation laws.50 However, little
guidance has been offered to lower courts regarding the applicability of
the modern general jurisdiction doctrine to FELA actions. If the FELA
confers jurisdiction to states where the defendant cannot be not found
“essentially at home,” it has the potential to violate railroad employers’
due process rights. Justice McKinnon notably opens up a discussion about
analyzing general jurisdiction over FELA claims in a new fashion.
A. Statutes Conferring Jurisdiction to States
Whenever a railroad is a named defendant in Montana, the Court
will find that both the FELA and Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b)(1)
are satisfied. The plain language of the FELA makes clear that an action
may be brought in a district court of the United States “in which the
defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action”
and that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction.51 Prior to the
addition of this language in 1910, the plaintiff had no option but to bring
a claim where the defendant resided.52 In order to save the expense of
transporting of witnesses, lawyers, and parties, the amendment was
“deliberately chosen to enable the plaintiff” to find the railroad at any
place it was doing business.53 The foundation of the amended language

44

Baker, supra note 42, at 82.
Id.
46
Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271 (N.Y. 1911).
47
See Baker, supra note 42, at 83.
48
45 U.S.C. § 56 (2016).
49
McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230 (1934).
50
Second Emp’rs’ Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
51
45 U.S.C. § 56 (2016).
52
See Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 49 (1941).
53
Id. at 50.
45
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coincides with the FELA’s underlying policy of rectifying “the injustice
to an injured employee.”54
The majority applied Denver & Rio Grande West Railroad
Company v. Terte,55 decided in 1935, to determine whether the “doing
business” standard of the FELA was met.56 In Terte, the United States
Supreme Court held that a railroad company satisfied the “doing business”
standard when it: (1) owned and operated railroad lines in the forum state;
(2) was licensed to do business in the forum state; (3) had an office and
agents in the forum state; and (4) those agents transacted “the business
ordinarily connected with the operation of a carrier by railroad.”57
Conversely, a railroad company that merely owned property, maintained
offices, and employed agents soliciting traffic in the forum state did not
satisfy the “doing business” standard.58
Per the Terte standard, it is undisputed that BNSF is doing
business in the state of Montana.59 BNSF owns and operates railroad lines
in Montana.60 BNSF is licensed to do business and has offices and agents
in Montana.61 Further, BNSF’s Montana agents transact business
connected with the ordinary operation of a railroad carrier.62 Therefore,
the majority properly concluded BNSF was “doing business” in Montana;
the Court appropriately determined that the statutory standard of the FELA
was satisfied.63
The “found within” standard under Montana’s long-arm statute,
Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b)(1), is similar to the “doing
business” standard under the FELA. The majority focused on the general
jurisdiction that exists over “[a]ll persons found within the state of
Montana.”64 The phrase “found within” is ambiguous on its face but has
been developed through case law. To be “found within” a state, the
defendant’s activities must be substantial, systematic, and continuous,65
“as opposed to isolated, casual, or incidental.”66 Under Bedrejo v. Triple
E Canada, Ltd.,67 significant factors to consider when determining if a
corporation is “found within” Montana include whether the corporation:
(1) is registered to do business in Montana; (2) has Montana offices; (3)
has employees in Montana; and (4) has conducted business in Montana.68
54

See id.
284 U.S. 285 (1932).
56
See Tyrrell v. BNSF Ry. Co, 373 P.3d 1, 6–7 (Mont. 2016).
57
Terte, 284 U.S. at 286.
58
Id.
59
See Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 7; Terte, 284 U.S. at 286.
60
Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 7.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
See id.; 45 U.S.C. § 56 (2016).
64
Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 8.
65
See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
66
Reed v. Am. Airlines, 640 P.2d 912, 914 (Mont. 1982).
67
984 P.2d 739 (Mont. 1999).
68
Bedrejo, 984 P.2d at 741–42.
55
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Further, the activities in Montana must compose “a significant component
of the company’s business, although the percentage as related to the total
business may be small.”69
BNSF is found within Montana because its business activities are
not isolated, casual, or incidental. As previously noted, BNSF is licensed
to do business in Montana and has offices and employees in Montana.70
Further, it is undisputed that BNSF operates trains and maintains traffic
offices in Montana.71 BNSF claims it has six percent of its track and about
five percent of its workforce in Montana.72 BNSF also maintains facilities
in Montana, owns Montana real estate, and directly advertises through
Montana media.73 The essential factors of Bedrejo are satisfied, and
although BNSF’s revenues in Montana are less than ten percent, statutory
personal jurisdiction cannot be defeated on the small revenue percentage
alone.74 Consequently, the Court properly held BNSF has contacts with
Montana such that it is “found” within the state under Rule 4(b)(1).75
The majority properly determined that Montana state courts can
statutorily assert personal jurisdiction over BNSF because it cannot be
disputed BNSF is “doing business” in and “found within” Montana.
However, whether federal or state, statutory jurisdiction is merely the first
element. The plain language of the FELA seemingly provides railroad
employees an unrivaled opportunity to forum shop when railroad
companies like BNSF operate throughout the country.76 Regardless of the
FELA’s grant of jurisdiction, though, there are constitutional limitations
on the number of forums a plaintiff may select from, and the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should operate to limit forum
shopping in FELA cases. 77
B. Due Process Clause
The dissent appropriately disagrees with the majority’s contention
“that Congress, not the Constitution, controls the sufficiency of process
that is required to hale BNSF into state courts in Montana.”78 BNSF is not
found “essentially at home” in Montana, and so Montana’s assertion of
69

Reed, 640 P.2d at 914.
Tyrrell v. BNSF Ry. Co., 373 P.3d 1, 8 (Mont. 2016).
71
Id.
72
Opening Br. of BNSF Ry. Co. at 4, Apr. 15, 2015, Cause No. DA 14-0826; see also Tyrrell, 373
P.3d at 8.
73
Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 8.
74
See Reed, 640 P.2d at 914.
75
See Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 8.
76
See BNSF Ry., About BNSF, BNSF.com, http://www.bnsf.com/about-bnsf/ (last visited Jul. 15,
2016) (“[o]perates in 28 states and three Canadian provinces”).
77
See Helicopteros Nacionales De Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (“Even when the cause
of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign corporations’ activities in the State, due process
is not offended by a State’s subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are
sufficient contacts between the State and foreign corporation” (citation omitted)).
78
Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 13 (emphasis in original) (McKinnon, L. dissenting).
70
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general personal jurisdiction violates the Due Process Clause.79 The
majority properly noted that after personal jurisdiction is held to exist
statutorily under Montana’s long-arm statute, the Court must determine
“whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice embodied in the [D]ue [P]rocess
[C]lause.”80 The second part of the general jurisdiction analysis should
also be used in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists when the
FELA statute is satisfied. The majority’s opinion that the FELA renders
Daimler inapplicable to railroad employers81 is unpersuasive because it
does not offer a substitute constitutionality prong for general jurisdiction
over railroads to comport with the Due Process Clause.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
in part that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”82 Although International Shoe
Company v. Washington83 involved specific jurisdiction, its introduction
of the phrase “continuous and systematic” laid the foundation for all
personal jurisdiction cases.84 In International Shoe, the Supreme Court
shifted the focus to the defendant corporation’s contacts with a forum,
rather than simply whether it was present or doing business in the forum.85
Contacts imply that the defendant has taken advantage of the benefits and
protections of the state’s laws.86 To require a corporation to defend suits
away from its home or where it carries on substantial activities “has been
thought to lay too great and unreasonable burden on the corporation to
comport with due process.”87 Thus, the constitutional standard for general
jurisdiction requires that a corporation have “continuous and systematic”
contacts such that “the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”88
Prior to Daimler, the Supreme Court had only decided three
general jurisdiction cases involving corporations.89 Until Goodyear’s
qualification of what it meant to be “at home” in 2011,90 the Supreme

79

See id. at 14.
Id. at 8 (majority opinion) (quoting Simmons Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., 796 P.2d 189, 193 (Mont.
1990)); see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
81
Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 6
82
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
83
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
84
Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317; see also Tanya J. Monestier, Where is Home Depot “At Home”?:
Daimler v. Bauman and the End of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 66 HASTING L.J. 233, 239 (2014).
85
Int’l Shoe Co., 325 U.S. at 316.
86
See id. at 320.
87
Id. at 317.
88
Id. at 316–17 (internal citation omitted).
89
See e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Helicopteros Nacionales De
Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915 (2011).
90
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924 (“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general
jurisdiction is the individual's domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the
80
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Court’s requirement of “continuous and systematic” contacts provided
little guidance because “it failed to address what types of contacts are
necessary, how extensive those contacts must be, and how continuous they
must be.”91 Again in Daimler, the Supreme Court upheld Goodyear’s
contacts rule to determine the constitutionality of state forum jurisdiction
over a foreign defendant.92 There are only a limited set of affiliations that
will confer all-purpose jurisdiction over a defendant, and “the paradigm
all-purpose forums for general jurisdiction are a corporation’s place of
incorporation and principal place of business.”93 There has only been one
“textbook” exceptional case in which general jurisdiction was properly
exercised over a corporate defendant with contacts so substantial it was
rendered at home in a forum other than its place of incorporation or
principal place of business.94 The defendant in Perkins v. Benguet Mining
Company95 moved to Ohio from the Philippines during World War II. 96
Overseeing the company’s activities from Ohio, the corporation’s
temporary principal place of business was in Ohio, essentially rendering it
at home.97 The inquiry of in-forum contacts thus became “whether [the]
corporation’s ‘affiliations with the State are so “continuous and
systematic” as to render it essentially at home in the forum State.’”98 Aside
from the Perkins defendant satisfying the modern inquiry, the Supreme
Court has yet to find a corporation essentially at home in a state other than
its place of incorporation and principal place of business.99
Assertion of general jurisdiction can only be justified under the
notion that “justice requires a certain and predictable place” where a
corporation can be reached for claims to be filed against it.100 Under the
FELA and under Montana law, BNSF’s contacts with Montana are not so
continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home, and to assert
general personal jurisdiction would violate BNSF’s due process rights. It
would put an unreasonable burden on BSNF to defend suit in Montana
where it is not at home nor does it do substantial business to render it
essentially at home.101 BNSF is incorporated in Delaware with its principal
place of business in Texas.102 BNSF does have six percent of its track in
corporation is fairly regarded as at home.” (identifying domicile, place of incorporation, and principal
place of business as paradigm bases for the exercise of general jurisdiction)).
Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home” and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C.
L. REV. 671, 675 (2012).
92
Daimler AG v. Bauman, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014).
93
Id. ___ U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 760, 749 (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924).
94
Id. ___ U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 755–56, 761 n.19.
95
342 U.S. 437 (1952).
96
Id. at 448.
97
Id.
98
Daimler, ___ U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 761.
99
See id.; Perkins, 342 U.S. at 448.
100
See Feder, supra note 91, at 693.
101
See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
102
Tyrrell v. BNSF Ry. Co., 373 P.3d 1, 3 (Mont. 2016).
91
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Montana and about five percent of its workforce in Montana but those
percentages would hardly render a corporation “essentially at home.” 103
The small ratio of a workforce being present in a state and doing business
in a state are immediately distinguishable from the facts presented in
Perkins.104 Further, extension of the Court’s analysis in Tyrrell would
make BNSF subject to unlimited jurisdiction in every state it operates,
which is neither certain nor predictable for BNSF.105
“A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be
deemed at home in all of them. . . .”106 The main takeaway from Daimler
is that in-state contacts must be compared to a corporation’s nationwide
contacts, and substantial contacts themselves do not render a corporation
at home.107 Because BNSF’s contacts with Montana are fairly minimal
compared to its presence throughout the nation, BNSF’s contacts are
insufficient for it to be at home in Montana, and—as the dissent opined—
“that is where the analysis of this case should come to end.”108
The majority is of the opinion that Daimler is not “novel law”
because it merely upheld Goodyear.109 While Daimler did uphold
Goodyear, it also notably dictated what makes contacts so continuous and
systematic as to render a corporation at home.110 The majority claimed that
Daimler is not applicable because it addressed events occurring outside
the United States, and BNSF did not cite cases that support preclusion of
state court jurisdiction.111 However, Daimler clears up the ambiguity of
what continuous and systematic affiliations of the defendants are, and
there is no evidence indicating the rule would not apply to railroad
corporations in the United States.112 The majority concluded, “Congress
drafted the FELA to make a railroad ‘at home’ for jurisdictional purposes
wherever it is ‘doing business.’”113 Although Congress may have drafted
the FELA for this purpose, the majority does not advise what
constitutional standard makes a railroad “essentially at home” to comport
with the Due Process Clause.114 The majority further stated, “Our own
103

See Opening Br. of BNSF Ry. Co. at 4, Apr. 15, 2015, Cause No. DA 14-0826; see also Tyrrell,
373 P.3d at 8.
104
See Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Daimler AG v. Bauman, ___ U.S. ___,
134 S. Ct. 746, 761 n.19 (2014).
105
See Feder, supra note 91, at 694 (The doing business standard approach “permit[s] potential
plaintiffs a panoply of fora from which they can choose the most plaintiff-friendly.”)
106
Daimler, ___ U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20.
107
See Daimler, ___ U.S. at ___, 134 St Ct. at 762 n.20; Monestier, supra note 84, at 254.
108
Tyrrell, 373 P.3d 1, 11 (2016) (McKinnon, L. dissenting).
109
Id. at 6 (majority opinion).
110
Daimler, ___ U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (“With respect to a corporation, the place of
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precedent on this issue is consistently clear and consonant with the U.S.
Supreme Court’s interpretation of 45 U.S.C § 56”; however, the U.S.
Supreme Court has never considered the relationship between the FELA
and general jurisdiction.115 Moreover, Congress does not set the standard
of assessing due process. The standard is set by the Constitution—not the
language of an Act. Therefore, there is nothing to suggest that the Supreme
Court would allow a lesser due process standard to be applied to railroad
employers.116
C. Future Impact on Railroads’ Due Process
When determining if general jurisdiction exists under a federal act
or state law, the court must look at the constitutionality of asserting
jurisdiction over a defendant and not just the statutes. Prior the Daimler
decision, it is possible that the rule requiring contacts so “continuous and
systematic” as to render a defendant “essentially at home” could be
interpreted vaguely.117 However, Daimler specifically addressed the issue
of general jurisdiction and upheld a clear rule for determining where a
corporation is “essentially at home.”118 Language drafted by Congress
does not supersede the applicability of the Due Process Clause, and the
Supreme Court has not implied that railroad defendants should have a
different due process standard.119
Even though the majority holds the Supreme Court has a
“century” of precedential interpretation of 45 U.S.C. § 56 and “decades of
consistent” decisions,120 it does not cite one corporate general jurisdiction
case or FELA general jurisdiction case.121 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has only decided four general jurisdiction cases involving corporate
defendants—none of which address the FELA.122 Thus, it is unpersuasive
to conclude that a case specifically addressing general personal
jurisdiction is not applicable to FELA cases.123 Now that a definitive test
to determine if a corporation is “essentially at home” has been set forth,
Montana should apply Daimler in all future general personal jurisdiction
determinations, including those under the FELA.124 Failure to do so creates
115
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overly broad assertions of general jurisdiction and leads to forum shopping
and unpredictable results for railroads like BNSF125
While the Court held “that the FELA is to be given a liberal
construction in favor of injured railroad employees so that it may
accomplish humanitarian and remedial purposes,”126 applying Daimler to
FELA cases does not disfavor railroad employees. It may limit the number
of states a claim can be brought in, but it does not take away the
humanitarian or remedial purpose of the FELA. In the cases at issue, the
plaintiffs would still have at least three viable options to bring their claims
under the Daimler standard: the state where the injury occurred, Delaware,
and Texas.127
When considering general jurisdiction, states courts must rely on
Daimler to determine whether or not the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over a railroad comports with the Due Process Clause.128 It would be
“unacceptably grasping” to subject railroads to general jurisdiction based
on the “doing business” standard alone, unless the Supreme Court holds a
different standard for railroad defendants.129 If the courts do not ensure the
exercise of jurisdiction over railroad companies comports with the Due
Process Clause, railroad defendants will continue to be hauled in to
improper court systems.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the words of Justice McKinnon, “A defendant does not forfeit
liberty or have a diminished liberty interest merely because the plaintiff
brings a FELA action. Nor does a defendant forfeit constitutional
protection by operating a railroad.”130 When assessing jurisdiction under
the FELA or under a state long-arm statute, courts must not forgo
constitutional considerations. Whether the defendant is a railroad
company, car dealership, or tire manufacturer the Due Process Clause still
requires that the “essentially at home” standard must be met before a court
may assert jurisdiction.131
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